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AConcluding Note: Increasing
Reliance on the Price Mechanism
Comprehensivequantitative restrictions of imports, as the major component
of a system of price control and rationing, were practiced and intensified
in Israel during the years 1949—51. This was the period in which the country,
which was just emerging from the War of Independence, about doubled its
population through immigration. It was argued then that under such unusual
conditions a market mechanism could not be expected adequately to fulfill the
tasks of an economic system—the determination of production, consumption,
and distribution. In particular, it was believed that establishing equilibrium
in the balance of payments by raising the rate of exchange enough to allow
freedom in international transactions would lead to a socially unacceptable
structure and distribution of imports.
In what way a rationing plan would be more effective than the market
mechanism was not usually very well specified. But presumably, the former
was intended to fulfill two objectives: One was to achieve a more equal in-
come distribution than a market mechanism would provide; and the other
was to increase savings and investment as proportions of income. Since these
targets could also be reached by a market mechanism plus taxes and subsidies,
it may be inferred that the OR system was judged to be a better, or perhaps
more feasible, means of implicit taxation than the conventional methods of
explicit taxation. For a while, the OR system seemed indeed to achieve some
equalization of income, by adding a price in "rationing points," distributed
equally among the population, to the conventional money price. It apparently
also produced, for some two years, a significant rate of "forced" savings. But
the Israeli experience has shown that the QR system could be maintained, and
177178CONCLUDING NOTE: INCREASING RELIANCE ON THE PRICE MECHANISM
its targets achieved, only for a short while and only insofar as it caused no
major deviations from what would have been the result of free market forces.
Since the price control and QR systems were combined, during these years,
with a very expansionary monetary-fiscal policy, it soon became unsustain-
able. By 1951, the degree of disequilibrium became high enough to lead to a
disintegration of the system—to very intensive shortages and scarcities, wide-
spread absenteeism of labor, and the rapid overtaking of the system by the
black market. From a political point of view, too, the system, which was pre-
sumably thought to be more acceptable than explicit taxation, became un-
tenable. The Israeli lesson from the period of 1949—5 1 is clear: a QR system
probably fulfills the task of distributing some essential goods from a given
stock better than any other system; but a comprehensive scheme of controls
and rationing cannot replace the market mechanism, once the degree of dis-
equilibrium in the system becomes substantial, unless a full shift is made to-
ward a centrally planned economic regime.
The degree of failure of administrative controls probably contributed
much to the fact that, once a shift to the use of the price mechanism was be-
gun in early 1952, it progressed virtually without any relapse. In this shift,
again, the foreign-exchange rate and import prices were the focal points of
the system as a whole. The switch was sudden and of overwhelming propor-
tions. Within a period of less than three years, the rate of exchange increased
fivefold; and although domestic prices, too, rose very fast, with the gradual
relaxation of controls, the PLD-EER more than doubled. By the latter half
of 1954, when this process was completed, the exchange rate and the balance
of payments were close to equilibrium, as were most other prices and quan-
tities in the economy. During this period of three years, despite a short period
of increased unemployment resulting from a restrictive monetary-fiscal policy,
the increase in the economy's productivity was particularly high and the
economy's growth particularly fast.
Once restriction of imports had been imposed due to balance-of-pay-
ments considerations, however, inevitably there were protective effects as
well. Thus, when equilibrium in the balance of payments was restored, in the
mid-1950s, the economy had already acquired patterns determined by the
protection until then afforded to import substitutes. While the correction of
a very high degree of balance-of-payments disequilibrium required only a
few years, the removal of the protective aspects of the QR system has not
been completed even at present, close to twenty years after the balance-of-
payments motivation for the restrictions had disappeared. Removal of the
QRs proved to be easy, and was performed quite rapidly, for imports of raw
materials and semimanufactured intermediate goods. Since these were not
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price range, liberalization of such imports did not effectively reduce protec-
tion to any local industrial branch. Indeed, such liberalization increased the
effective protection granted to local industries using these intermediate in-
puts and was therefore welcomed by those industries. When, however, an im-
port good did compete with a local industry, and the effect of its liberalization
was to lower effective protection, the situation was radically different. Such
liberalization of imports competing with local industries—mainly imports of
finished consumer goods—started only much later, and by a much more
gradual and protracted process. In fact, total protection of import substitutes
by QRs remained in force some seven or eight years after the restoration of
the balance-of-payments equilibrium. Only with the second New Economic
Policy, in 1962, did the progressive relaxation of these restrictions start. Even
then, for some seven years the change was primarily in the form of protection:
quantitative restrictions were replaced by the price mechanism, that is, by
appropriate tariffs designed to grant each industry roughly the same protec-
tion it had enjoyed under the QR regime. In this sense, then, the shift from the
use of QRs to reliance on the price mechanism was completed not in 1954 but
only some fourteen years later, in 1968. Since 1969, a gradual reduction in
the level of effective protection of the industries formerly enjoying OR pro-
tection has been underway. And by present forecasts, over twenty years are
anticipated to pass between the time the original balance-of-payments motiva-
tion for QRs disappeared and the time when most of the protection afforded
by this system will have been removed. The lesson drawn from this experi-
ence in Israel is that once comprehensive QRs of imports are imposed, and
the economy's structure adjusts to them, the protective aspect of the system
is not easy to remove. Liberalization of QRs is easy and speedy where it
leads to an increase in effective protection to local import-using industries;
but when, to the contrary, it lowers protection, the liberalization process
must be gradual and protracted. The process is likely to be helped by a shift
in the method of protection from QRs to tariffs, even though at first such a
shift may be purely a nominal liberalization, leaving the level of protection
unaffected.
The degree of protection has throughout been much less uniform, and
on the average higher, for import substitutes than for exports. This was obvi-
ous under the OR regime, when the importation of almost anything that com-
peted with existing or potentially feasible local production was in fact banned,
leading sometimes to extremely high levels of protection in import-substitu-
tion industries, whereas no similar policy of producing at "any cost" was
applied to exports. When QRs were replaced by tariffs designed to afford each
branch the same protection as the QRs, the level and dispersion of protection
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gardless of the QRs, and abstracting from the tariffs that were designed to
replace them, effective protective rates appear to have been higher and, pri-
marily, much more diversified for import substitutes than for exports.
Several factors could explain this difference between import substitutes
and exports. One is a tendency toward a policy of autarky, which apparently
prevailed during the I 950s. Another is the size of the two sectors: exports
being, particularly in the earlier years, a very small segment of total trade,
they carried relatively little weight in the policymaking process. Still another
factor, certainly not one confined to the case of Israel, was that protection to
import substitutes could be hidden to some extent: protection afforded not
by QRs but by tariffs even yields a revenue to the government, whereas export
subsidies are mostly a governmental expenditure. Another factor, apparently
specific to the case of Israel, was the early recognition by the government that
protection should be measured by its effect on the price of the value added
rather than the price of the final good: ever since the mid-1950s this view has
been almost universally accepted in Israel and has been applied to exports in
particular. Effective protective rates in exports were thus considered and de-
termined directly, and not as a chance by-product of decisions about nominal
rates of subsidy, a fact which certainly contributed to the uniformity of these
rates. In imports this principle was not generally applied, probably because
high import duties (unlike export subsidies) had existed before the effective
protective principle was recognized, and because tariff duties also fulfill other
functions besides protection. In the stage of nominal liberalization of the
1960s the effective protection principle was most probably applied in the de-
termination of import duties; but in this case, it was designed to maintain the
nonuniform degrees of protection introduced by the QR system rather than
to lead to a uniform level. The progressive lowering of protection since 1969,
on the other hand, has been aimed at achieving uniformity of effective pro-
tection in import substitution.
The combination of the relatively large size of the import-substituting
sector and the large dispersion in the degree of protection granted to the vari-
ous industries involved must have resulted in a significant loss of productive
capacity due to misallocation of resources. The loss from protection of ex-
ports, on the other hand, could not be of a substantial size, even in recent
years, when the export sector has grown in importance.
The process of devaluation, which started in 1952, has proceeded ever
since, either through large-scale formal devaluations or small changes in
nonformal components of the exchange rate, such as import tariffs and export
subsidies. Both the size of the several devaluations, however, and their degree
of success, varied considerably. The formal devaluation of 1952—54 could be
termed an unqualified success, and was probably an example rarely repeated
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less than three years. During this period, not only was the QR system largely
scrapped and the severe shortage of imports largely eliminated, but the quan-
tity of imports also declined, while the national product increased at a very
fast rate. Exports, too, rose during the period at a record rate. Other devalua-
tions, on the other hand, notably the formal devaluation of 1962, fared much
less well, and the benefits were dissipated within only a few years. As dis-
cussed in the concluding section of Chapter 5, the major factor which ac-
counts for the difference in performance between the devaluation of 1952—
54 and other devaluations was the nature of the accompanying demand
policy: this was restrictive during most of the period of 1952—54, and expan-
sionary during other episodes of devaluation.
The contrast in fiscal and monetary policies between 1952—54 and sub-
sequent devaluations may probably be explained mainly on two grounds. One
is that the first devaluation was undertaken under emergency conditions,
when the country's external reserves were nil and a general feeling of collapse
was pervasive, whereas the other devaluations were undertaken in more secure
circumstances. The other difference lies in the strong, automatically expan-
sionary impact the later devaluations had on money and liquidity in the
economy, owing to the existence and accumulation of external and exchange-
rate-linked assets. The lesson which may be drawn from the history of the
devaluation process in Israel is that although a restrictive demand policy is
essential to the success of a devaluation, it is particularly difficult to under-
take when strong automatic forces lead in an expansionary direction and
when no sense of emergency prevails in the population or among policy-
makers.
One indicator of the success of the various steps in the process of de-
valuation is the movement of the level of the PPP-adjusted EER, which shows
the relative change in the price of tradables (exports and imports) versus
other prices. The level of this rate increased considerably (by close to 150
per cent) from the time just before promulgation of the 1952 New Economic
Policy to the mid-1950s. Since then, however, the rate has been stable over
the long run, with the various acts of devaluation leading only to temporary
fluctuations in its level.
Two major forces seem to have motivated the devaluation process, both
operating mainly in the early and mid-I 950s. One, mentioned earlier, was the
need to overcome the consequences of the system of controls and restrictions
of 1949—51, and to replace this collapsing system by a workable price mecha-
nism. The other was the need to reduce the dependence of the economy on
capital imports, and to provide for the economy's continuous growth in face
of a relative decline in the inflow of foreign capital. Indeed, the second target
has been achieved just as well as the first: there has been almost continuous
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ence of the economy on capital imports, as measured by the ratio of the im-
port surplus to the GNP, has sharply declined. Reduction of this dependence
took place almost entirely during the 1950s: in later years, there are large
fluctuations, but the long-term trend is only slightly downward.
It is interesting to note that this drastic (relative) reduction of the im-
port surplus altered only slightly the importance of foreign trade for the econ-
omy. This may be illustrated by the following comparison of the beginning
and end pairs of years of the period under review. In 1950—5 1, the ratio of
the import surplus (excluding imports of military goods) to GNP was about
43 per cent; in 1971—72, it was less than 10 per cent. Yet, the combined ratio
of value added in exports and of imports for domestic use (again., excluding
military imports) to GNP declined merely from about 50 per cent in 1950—51
to 47 per cent in 1 970—7 1. Despite the overwhelming decline of the import
surplus, the economy retained almost the same degree of openness as before;
that is, the declining gap between imports and exports was provided chiefly
by export expansion rather than by a contraction of imports. This process,
again, did not follow a uniform course over the years. During the 1950s, it
was primarily a reduction of imports which contributed to the decline in the
import surplus. In later years, on the other hand, imports not only ceased de-
clining but even increased slightly, while exports expanded substantially.
This performance stands in sharp contrast to the prevailing view in Israel
during the first few years after the establishment of the state, which leaned to-
ward autarkic development. Based on something like an "absolute advantage"
theory, the common argument made was that a country in Israel's position,
with almost no raw materials and little industrial skill, could become com-
petitive in only a very few goods. Having little to offer to the outside world, it
therefore had to turn inward, producing for itself whatever it possibly could.
In illustration of the extent to which Israel's actual growth process has devi-
ated from this dim projection, it may be noted that by the early 1970s, value
added of Israel's exports exceeded its 1950 GNP. Given the substantial change
in relative prices introduced in the 1950s, rapid growth has thus been con-
sistent with the drastic reduction of the economy's dependence on the import
surplus and with maintenance of an open economy.